I would be very surprised indeed if the intersection of front-line terrorists and users of industrial encryption was an empty set.
I think it's more likely the intersection of caught and prosecuted terrorists and users of industrial encryption is an empty set - or at least a much smaller set than those who use FB Messenger to coordinate attacks.
This is not an argument for backdoors. I suspect the real inefficiencies in monitoring don't come from lack of evidence, but from lack of efficient data processing and flagging.
https://ctc.usma.edu/how-terrorists-use-encryption/
I would be very surprised indeed if the intersection of front-line terrorists and users of industrial encryption was an empty set.
I think it's more likely the intersection of caught and prosecuted terrorists and users of industrial encryption is an empty set - or at least a much smaller set than those who use FB Messenger to coordinate attacks.
This is not an argument for backdoors. I suspect the real inefficiencies in monitoring don't come from lack of evidence, but from lack of efficient data processing and flagging.