> If the user's github credentials were compromised (lots of ways for that to happen which don't involve their system/keys being compromised, like using the same password across sites), then using GPG signatures would still allow cloners to check/detect problems since they wouldn't have the maliciously-updated github GPG key (or they might be one of the few folks still using the Web of Trust).
This assumes that the attacker wouldn't simply upload their own key to public keyservers with the same email address. I would be shocked if more people would notice the use of an additional key than would notice, say, Git's warning when history changes between different repos.
The big win is having multiple copies with independent access control. I'm not opposed to using GPG but in practice the benefits are fairly minimal and there's a massive usability hit for anything involving GPG. In the case of a legal code that's probably justified but it's probably well into diminishing returns.
This assumes that the attacker wouldn't simply upload their own key to public keyservers with the same email address. I would be shocked if more people would notice the use of an additional key than would notice, say, Git's warning when history changes between different repos.
The big win is having multiple copies with independent access control. I'm not opposed to using GPG but in practice the benefits are fairly minimal and there's a massive usability hit for anything involving GPG. In the case of a legal code that's probably justified but it's probably well into diminishing returns.