Back in Ron Rivest's 6.857 computer security class, we spent some time on electronic voting. If you're not careful to get the privacy right, you open up more opportunities for coercion.
With anonymous paper ballots, coercion can and does happen, but it basically requires physical control of the polling station / voting booth to pull off.
In this case, anonymized ballots are put on a blockchain. Hopefully the system is auditable, but provides no way for someone to prove which anonymized ballot serial number belongs to them. Otherwise, the thugs can come to your house and either beat you or pay you your bribe after forcing you to reveal how you voted.
Back in Ron Rivest's 6.857 computer security class, we spent some time on electronic voting. If you're not careful to get the privacy right, you open up more opportunities for coercion.
With anonymous paper ballots, coercion can and does happen, but it basically requires physical control of the polling station / voting booth to pull off.
In this case, anonymized ballots are put on a blockchain. Hopefully the system is auditable, but provides no way for someone to prove which anonymized ballot serial number belongs to them. Otherwise, the thugs can come to your house and either beat you or pay you your bribe after forcing you to reveal how you voted.