Lots of people here pointing out that BRK's buying strategy isn't what distinguishes their business so much as their access to insurance float. That's a good point, probably the most important one.
Also worth looking at is the relative contribution of these kinds of acquisitions to BRK's overall performance. Simply put, it's not Borsheim's and See's Candy that give BRK.A a $425B market cap. There's an enormous portfolio of high-ticket investments --- many of them in gigantic public companies --- that dwarf these mom-and-pop acquisitions. Even among the wholly owned subsidiaries, and even in the smaller "Manufacturing and Retail" segment, contributions are dominated by very large companies like Clayton Homes.
Noted below in the thread, the "powerhouse five" of Berkshire's portfolio: BNSF Railroads, IMC (one of the largest metalworking companies in the world), Lubrizol, Berkshire Energy, and Marmon (one of the largest home builders in the US). I doubt very much the acquisition of any of these companies followed the casual pattern listed in the post. Some of them weren't even acquired all at once.
Finally: having twice been involved in the sale of a company I was a principal at, the acquisition process was pretty unlike the breakdown this person provided. It was somewhere in between what he reports Buffett's process to be and what he claims the normal process is. The actual decision --- getting to an MOU with a notional price --- was reasonably informal and didn't take up much time. Certainly nobody did a road show. The rest of the process was legal, and I very much doubt Berkshire avoids much of that work either.
Also worth looking at is the relative contribution of these kinds of acquisitions to BRK's overall performance. Simply put, it's not Borsheim's and See's Candy that give BRK.A a $425B market cap. There's an enormous portfolio of high-ticket investments --- many of them in gigantic public companies --- that dwarf these mom-and-pop acquisitions. Even among the wholly owned subsidiaries, and even in the smaller "Manufacturing and Retail" segment, contributions are dominated by very large companies like Clayton Homes.
Noted below in the thread, the "powerhouse five" of Berkshire's portfolio: BNSF Railroads, IMC (one of the largest metalworking companies in the world), Lubrizol, Berkshire Energy, and Marmon (one of the largest home builders in the US). I doubt very much the acquisition of any of these companies followed the casual pattern listed in the post. Some of them weren't even acquired all at once.
Finally: having twice been involved in the sale of a company I was a principal at, the acquisition process was pretty unlike the breakdown this person provided. It was somewhere in between what he reports Buffett's process to be and what he claims the normal process is. The actual decision --- getting to an MOU with a notional price --- was reasonably informal and didn't take up much time. Certainly nobody did a road show. The rest of the process was legal, and I very much doubt Berkshire avoids much of that work either.