Does Subgraph isolate USB and network? The isolated serviceVMs for USB and network are in my opinion a very strong value proposition of Qubes.
Furthermore, is Subgraph supposed to be an OS for everyday use, like Qubes, or just for anonymous usage like Tails or Whonix? If its the former I don't understand why all traffic should be routed via Tor by default - it wouldn't make sense to route non-anonymous traffic (banking, personal mail, etc.) via Tor. It wouldn't be anonymous anyway and also because of the unnecessary risk of exposure to malicious exit nodes. In this sense I believe the Qubes approach with its optional WhonixVM is superior.
If Subgraph is supposed to be for anonymous usage I'd like to read more about what kind of threat model it is trying to address. I don't think there are any amnesic features like in Tails nor strong isolation between gateway and workstation to prevent IP leaks like in Whonix.
Furthermore, is Subgraph supposed to be an OS for everyday use, like Qubes, or just for anonymous usage like Tails or Whonix? If its the former I don't understand why all traffic should be routed via Tor by default - it wouldn't make sense to route non-anonymous traffic (banking, personal mail, etc.) via Tor. It wouldn't be anonymous anyway and also because of the unnecessary risk of exposure to malicious exit nodes. In this sense I believe the Qubes approach with its optional WhonixVM is superior.
If Subgraph is supposed to be for anonymous usage I'd like to read more about what kind of threat model it is trying to address. I don't think there are any amnesic features like in Tails nor strong isolation between gateway and workstation to prevent IP leaks like in Whonix.