You are correct that we are vague about the threat model in this case. But please keep in mind that encrypting local data at rest defends against a whole category of "compromise" (i.e., the data stored long term on the local disk being captured) then the case of a malicious process running on the user's machine while the user is actively using 1Password.
Officially our view is "if a malicious process with user privileges is running on the users machine when they use 1Password, there is little we can do".
But sometimes we try to do better. The example I raise is the steps we take to make things harder for keystroke loggers. We won't go to extraordinary measures to enter a battle that we can't win, but when there are simple things that we can do to make things harder for malware, we will.
Officially our view is "if a malicious process with user privileges is running on the users machine when they use 1Password, there is little we can do".
But sometimes we try to do better. The example I raise is the steps we take to make things harder for keystroke loggers. We won't go to extraordinary measures to enter a battle that we can't win, but when there are simple things that we can do to make things harder for malware, we will.
See the first three paragraphs of https://blog.agilebits.com/2014/08/21/watch-what-you-type-1p... for some sort of attempt to clarify our vagueness about this threat model.