They don't even have to do that. They wrote the OS, they have the signing key for OS updates. All they need to do is push an update to the device with a backdoor that allows reading off the unencrypted contents post-boot (possibly with the addition of a judicially compelled fingerprint scan or PIN brute force to get the encryption key out of whatever on-device escrow it's stored in).
The only way to secure the device against that would be to have the users manually memorize and key in a complete 128 bit encryption key, which they could then refuse to provide.
I think we tech folks were fooling ourselves with the idea that Apple had somehow delivered a "snoop-proof" device. They really didn't (no one can!) as long as they're subject to government or judicial control.
The only way to secure the device against that would be to have the users manually memorize and key in a complete 128 bit encryption key, which they could then refuse to provide.
I think we tech folks were fooling ourselves with the idea that Apple had somehow delivered a "snoop-proof" device. They really didn't (no one can!) as long as they're subject to government or judicial control.