>Now correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems you're suggesting that "externalities" are better handled by rulers
No, they're suggesting that externalities are not handled well by entities that, by definition, have no incentive to care about them.
But as it happens, yes I tend to think co-ordination problems are solved more effectively by a co-ordinator, rather than decentralised actors.
You can call them "rulers" if you like, but then you'd be ignoring the concept of democracy.
>you'd support voluntary co-operation
Except you don't support "voluntary" anything, because you're talking about property rights. You know, a system where people are forced to follow particular rules about resource allocation, regardless of whether they agreed to follow them.
As long as there is scarcity, there will inevitably be coercion in the distribution of resources. You can argue that a system of pure property rights minimises it, but please don't pretend that it magically avoids it.
No, they're suggesting that externalities are not handled well by entities that, by definition, have no incentive to care about them.
But as it happens, yes I tend to think co-ordination problems are solved more effectively by a co-ordinator, rather than decentralised actors.
You can call them "rulers" if you like, but then you'd be ignoring the concept of democracy.
>you'd support voluntary co-operation
Except you don't support "voluntary" anything, because you're talking about property rights. You know, a system where people are forced to follow particular rules about resource allocation, regardless of whether they agreed to follow them.
As long as there is scarcity, there will inevitably be coercion in the distribution of resources. You can argue that a system of pure property rights minimises it, but please don't pretend that it magically avoids it.